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Africa Report

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Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia

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ECONOMIC NOTES

Ghana-VALCO Reach Accord

Ghana's massive Volta Project moved forward another step with the agreement on November 17 between the Ghana Government and the Volta Aluminum Company, Ltd. (VALCO) on the price to be charged VALCO's aluminum smelter for electric power, and on the taxes to be paid by the smelter operation. (See *Africa Report*, October 1960, p. 7). Financing of the smelter is the major remaining problem, but each of the companies forming VALCO is expected to finance its own share if the American companies participating can obtain a US Government guarantee on their investment against expropriation and other political risks.

The participants in VALCO are Kaiser Aluminum, the sponsor of the consortium, Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), Reynolds Metals Co., and Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corp., all from the United States; and Aluminium Ltd., a Canadian company. British Aluminium Co., Ltd., has dropped from the group. Each participant is expected to market the same percentage of the smelter's output as its equity in relation to VALCO's total equity. Kaiser will manage the smelter, and the board of directors will represent the participating companies.

Smelter construction reportedly will begin in 1961 and be completed by 1966, and preparations for the dam and power plant are moving along rapidly. Kaiser has prepared the site for the dam, which will create the

world's largest man-made lake. Bids for building the dam are due January 17.

A second dam upstream at Bui on the Black Volta—the Black and White Volta have their source in the Voltaic Republic and come together in north central Ghana to form the Volta River—may be designed by the USSR. The Bui site, about 100 miles north of Kumasi and less than 20 miles from the Ivory Coast border, was suggested by the Volta River Preparatory Commission in 1953 to provide electric power for Kumasi and for a national grid or network of power lines for industrial and home use into which the excess power from the main Volta power plant was also to be fed.

The announcement of USSR participation appeared in the semi-official *Ghana Times*, attributed to the leader of the 18-man Soviet economic and technical assistance mission in Ghana under the USSR-Ghana technical co-operation agreement signed in August. (See *Africa Report*, October 1960). It was stated that the Soviet Union might also supply a survey, technicians, and technical equipment for the smaller Bui dam.

Guinea Development Assured

Guinea's President Sekou Toure announced on November 22 that he now had assured financing for Guinea's \$156,000,000 three-year economic development program, designed to increase national income an average of eight percent a year. Of the total, he stated that about \$131,000,000 had been promised as loans from Communist China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, East Germany, and Ghana, and \$11,000,000 from West Germany. The loans will be used to buy the capital equipment needed for the development program, which must all be imported. Most of Guinea's export earnings are needed to pay for imports of consumer goods, and leave little or no extra foreign exchange to pay for imported capital equipment.

Israel-Mali Sign Pacts

The governments of Israel and Mali announced in mid-November the signature of a series of general and special pacts on technical, economic and cultural relations, as well as on civil aviation. The treaties were signed in Jerusalem by Jean-Marie Kone, Vice-President of the Mali Republic, and by the Israel Foreign Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir.

Under these treaties, Israel and Mali are to cooperate in the fields of research for agricultural development, public health, and medical training; in vocational training schemes and the exchange of technicians; and in the improvement of sea and land com-

munications. In addition, the aviation companies of the two countries will be accorded landing rights in air fields of both countries and the right to deploy passengers and goods from and to them; collaboration will be established in the spheres of culture and the arts; Israeli experts will assist in the erection of a cement factory and in an enterprise for the assembly of radio equipment, and lastly, the Government of Israel will place at the disposal of Mali a number of scholarships for the training of some young Mali students in Israel.

Mali is not the first African state with which Israel has developed ties of this nature, but this is the first time that an official pact has been entered into, giving formal expression to collaboration between the two countries.

Ethiopia Gets U.S. Loan

The US Government's Development Loan Fund (DLF) approved on November 28 a \$2,000,000 loan to Ethiopia for development of agriculture and industry. The loan will go to the government-owned Development Bank of Ethiopia, to provide funds for private borrowers who would increase and diversify agricultural production, and for expansion of such related industrial enterprises as slaughtering, meat packing, food canning, shipbuilding, and wire insulating.

Loans to private borrowers will not require prior DLF approval unless they are more than \$50,000. Up to half the total \$2,000,000 may be used initially for financing local currency costs of projects, but these dollars must be earmarked and subsequently used to finance purchases from the United States.

Labouisse to Advise IBRD

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) has appointed Henry R. Labouisse as its Special Representative for Africa, effective January 1, 1960. Mr. Labouisse, an American national, is to act as liaison with African governments, explaining the purposes and methods of the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association. He will also report on developments in Africa and will advise the Bank on its relations with African countries.

Mr. Labouisse, who has recently been serving as special adviser to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld on the UN operations in the Congo, has also been consultant to the World Bank, chief of a 1959 World Bank mission to Venezuela, and director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees from 1954 to 1958.

—Norman W. Mosher

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
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Spanish Guinea—

Profile of an African Enigma



By SANFORD BERMAN

Africa's colonial territories, from Gabon to Tanganyika, are quick-marching to independence and nationhood, but Spanish Guinea daily becomes even more closely allied to the Spanish metropole. While African poets elsewhere write bitterly of white injustice, Guinea's single African novelist extols the European civilizer. African statesmen only a few miles away speak earnestly of a continental black federation; the new African mayor of Santa Isabel, administrative seat of Spain's West African minuscule, talks of his city as "a great Spanish capital." In the Congo, Rhodesia, and the Union there are strikes, battles, and foreign agents. In Spanish Guinea there are bullfights. While most of Africa undergoes violent political convulsions, Spanish Guinea, to all appearances, remains serene.

Paternalism Everywhere

The Guinea enigma results from a complex of factors. One is thoroughgoing Spanish paternalism. Health services are well organized; the leprosaria at Ebibeyin and Micomeseng are very likely unequaled on the continent. Although some Nigerian contract workers still complain of maltreatment and sub-standard working conditions, a 1957 Nigerian parliamentary delegation found welfare facilities generally excellent and reported that the Spanish administration was genuinely willing to correct deficiencies. A special tutelary agency, the *Patronato de Indigenas*, supervises the "uncivilized" African population. It guarantees the integrity of communal lands, regulates loans and savings, operates orphanages, underwrites schools and hospitals, grants scholarships, and foment native agricultural cooperatives. Nuns conduct homemaking and child-care classes for African women.

Assimilation Possible

A second factor conducive to political tranquility might be termed "limited assimilation"—a policy which permits the "evolved" or "civilized" African to enjoy full rights and privileges as a Spanish citizen. *Emancipados*, though few in number, are accorded full social equality; many send their offspring to peninsular schools. Catholic ecclesiastics have encouraged the formation of an indigenous clergy; about 30 Africans now study at the Banapa seminary on

Fernando Poo, and a mounting number of African women have been admitted to religious sisterhoods. Numerous Africans have been trained as auxiliaries in the Health and Education Departments. In December 1960, Madrid announced that three of the six representatives from Fernando Poo and Rio Muni being sworn in as members of the Spanish Cortes (Assembly) were Africans. This is the first time that non-Europeans have occupied seats in the Cortes.

An entire town, equipped with modern facilities, was built outside Santa Isabel to house select African functionaries. The homes are rent-free and occupants can opt to secure permanent title by paying small monthly installments. Hispanized Africans of demonstrated loyalty to the metropole receive handsome state decorations and the award-decrees are usually signed by Generalissimo Franco himself. Many of the African elite are periodically entertained on the peninsula.

A third ingredient in the territory's relative calm is the simple non-existence of either the incentive or

Airfield in Fernando Poo

Construction has begun on an all-weather, class "A" airport outside of Santa Isabel on the Spanish-owned island of Fernando Poo.

When completed in 1962 at an expected cost of nearly 170,000,000 pesetas (\$2,833,333), the field will be able to accommodate jet and heavy commercial craft. At present, the only airport on Fernando Poo is limited to low-capacity carriers of the DC-3 type.

means for political activity and protest. In July 1959 the colony was transformed into two Spanish provinces: Rio Muni and Fernando Poo. Subsequent legislation has reorganized the territorial administration to approximate provincial structures on the peninsula. As an integral portion of the metropole, the political climate of Spain obtains equally in Guinea. Thus there are no labor unions, no political parties, no opposition press.

There has never been even an intimation of eventual autonomy or independence. No reports on Guinea are submitted to the UN Trusteeship Council, though one has now been promised; none of the ILO conventions dealing with African labor have been ratified. The highest administrative posts are safely reserved to Spaniards; and an effective insulatory system prevents the invasion of political agitators and "divisive" ideas. A pass system inhibits the movement of some 20,000 Nigerian laborers within the territory.

The official primary school curriculum emphasizes "patriotic formation" and "love of Spain." Spanish-language instruction is required in all

schools, even those operated by American Presbyterian missionaries. Although foreign clerics are tolerated, they are so frequently harassed that their influence is minimal. Too, the indigenous population is ethnically fragmented and was only lately subjected to intensive European control, facts which further militate against a massive, unified resistance to European suzerainty.

Sources of Potential Discontent

There is another aspect, however, to this portrait of Hispano-African bliss. At least three elements of Guinea's African population represent potential sources of discontent and political activism:

1. The "Fernandinos" of Santa Isabel are better-educated as well as far more prosperous and mobile than the remainder of the territory's Africans. Their background is more English than Spanish, since most are descended from Sierra Leonian, Gambian, and Kru slaves liberated by British warships in the mid-nineteenth century. Many are still Protestant and pidgin-English is practically a *lingua franca* in the capital. A Spanish observer has dourly reported that the group "harbors sentiments of the vague Negro nationalism."

2. Indigenous Guinea Africans "civilized" by the Spanish could conceivably rebel at the limitations imposed upon their personal advancement, the wholesale depreciation of their cultural heritage, and the deliberate Spanish policy of moulding the bulk of their "unemancipated" brethren into a body of docile agriculturists, artisans, and domestic servants. Indirect evidence of such disaffection appears in *Tierra negra*, a novel by the Spaniard, Domingo Manfredi Cano. Manfredi's protagonists are two Bubi brothers, one a priest, the other a doctor. The priest defends Spanish tutelage, the doctor argues for overthrow of white domination. Ultimately, the priest triumphs, but the very suggestion of African unrest is remarkable.

3. Among unsophisticated Africans, there has flourished a clandestine, quasi-nativistic sect, the Mbueti, which represents a defensive reaction to Westernism. The sect has drawn adherents largely from mainland Pamues (or Fang), but also includes members from groups on the continental littoral and Fernando Poo. It is at once super-tribal and super-territorial, for there are sect-members in neighboring Gabon and Cameroun, as well. The Mbueti has not yet proven politically articulate, but its considerable extension, hierarchic organization, and the fervor generated among participants prompted a long-time Spanish resident in Guinea to term it "a certain political danger."

That these forces, either singly or in unison, will unseat the Spanish from their dominion over Guinea is problematical. If Spain is forced to

relinquish its tropical "provinces," the impetus will most probably derive from outside the territory. And there is no reason to believe that Spain could be easily dispossessed. When Ifni, the lilliput Saharan enclave, was attacked by Moroccan nationalists in 1957, Spanish reaction was swift and forceful. Guinea, aside from enriching the metropolitan economy with valuable products like cacao, coffee, bananas, and cabinet woods, is a prized laboratory for scholars, an exotic subject for literati and artists, a propitious field for missionary zealots, and—most important—a prime source of prestige to an historically imperialist power.

Sanford Berman, author of the above article, is Chief of the Washington, D. C. Public Library's Acquisitions Department, and is currently preparing an extensive annotated bibliography on Spanish Guinea as a Master's Thesis at Catholic University. His articles have appeared in *Phylon*, the *Journal of Negro History*, and *African Affairs*.

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(For staff of Africa Report, see page 2)

Southern Rhodesia: 1961 Trouble Spot?



View of Salisbury from Kopje

—Federal Information Department, Salisbury

By T. O. RANGER*

Salisbury

As the *Times* of London ruefully remarked, one of the surprises of the latter half of 1960—at least for those who had not been following developments here closely—has been the sudden flare-up of political and racial tension in Southern Rhodesia.

The conventional picture of Southern Rhodesia has been that of a calm and stable oasis which had succeeded in avoiding both the racialist excesses of neighboring South Africa and the turbulence of the west coast. Even the African intellectuals were stereotyped—as a patient, passive group constructively employed in non-political pursuits. The doubts which existed in Britain over the color bar, the unequal division of land between Africans and Europeans, the enshrinement of the principal of possessory segregation in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, and the concentration of all political power in the hands of the white minority were to a great extent set at rest by Southern Rhodesia's acceptance of the "partnership" principal when the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was created in 1953.

First Crisis in 1958

Actually, the first overt sign of trouble beneath the placid exterior which Southern Rhodesia had shown to the world since the colony gained Responsible Self Government from Britain in 1923 appeared in 1958, when a cabinet conspiracy resulted in the overthrow of the energetic Prime Minister Garfield Todd and his

replacement by a far more conservative personality, Sir Edgar Whitehead.

In 1959, during the Nyasaland crisis, Sir Edgar took unprecedented steps to contain any potential spread of trouble to Southern Rhodesia, declaring a state of emergency, banning the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress and other external Congress movements, and authorizing the arrest of some 500 officers and members of the Congress movement.

Complacency Persists

Even these events had remarkably little effect on outside opinion, which was disposed to accept Sir Edgar's explanation that the destruction of so radical a group as the Congress was necessary to give "partnership" a fair chance. As for Southern Rhodesia itself, the ruling party was able to preserve what now seems a fatuous complacency until as late as July 1960. Less than a week before the first of a series of major African demonstrations shattered all these various illusions, Sir Edgar publicly described the Colony as a haven of calm amidst the surrounding storms.

In July there began the series of sensational political developments which has made Southern Rhodesia one of the most fascinating countries in Africa to observe and one of the most disturbing to live in. The demonstrations of July 20, in which some 30,000 people joined in an impressive but peaceful protest against the arrest of three African political leaders, were followed as soon as they had been broken up by riots in Salisbury and Bulawayo. Ever since, there has been sporadic rioting in all the urban centers along the Salisbury-Bulawayo road—strikes accompanied by violence in Que Que and Gatooma; a most

destructive riot following the ejection of European security men from an African meeting in Gwelo; and, worst of all, a riot in Salisbury in October which almost amounted to a pitched battle between rioters and police and which arose merely out of an accident involving a European motorist and an African cyclist.

In addition to these clashes, there have been other sporadic manifestations of African discontent—including a series of strikes and walk-outs, and clashes between teachers and pupils in government and mission schools resulting in the temporary closure of some schools and the expulsion of dozens of schoolboys. By far the most picturesque incident, however, was Sir Edgar Whitehead's attempt to address a meeting in a Salisbury African township, which ended with such uproar that the Prime Minister had to be bundled to safety through a window.

Official Controls Stiffen

Government reaction to these incidents has been harsh. Before the July riots, the British South Africa police had the cherished record of never having fired a shot in anger since the suppression of the Matabele and Mashona risings at the end of the nineteenth century. In Bulawayo in July 1960, they lost that record by killing 12 Africans and wounding many others. Since then, there has been frequent resort to the gun in dealing with rioters or demonstrators instead of batons or tear gas. In the Harare riots of October 8, nine Africans were shot dead by regular and reservist policemen in circumstances where, strictly speaking, there was no necessity to open fire at all.

After the demonstrations and riots

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of July, Sir Edgar Whitehead announced that more police and army units were to be raised immediately. Following the riot of October 8, he announced that troops were to be stationed in all the main African townships and that stringent security legislation would be introduced.

This new legislation has now gone through. It includes a Vagrancy Act which enables the government to round up "spivs and loafers"—i.e., the unemployed of the African townships—and to keep them in "rehabilitation centers" for up to three years. It includes a new Emergency Powers Act which enables the government to resort to emergency measures for a considerably longer period than was previously possible without reference to Parliament. And it includes a Law and Order (Maintenance) Act which gives the government an astonishingly comprehensive series of powers and which sets minimum sentences for various offences.

Under this act, the government has wide powers to suppress publications, to prohibit political activity of all kinds, and to silence criticism. Indeed, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, in conjunction with the 1959 Preventive Detention and Unlawful Organizations Acts, gives the Southern Rhodesian Government a repressive armory unrivaled even in South Africa.

Other Reactions Noted

Although the government's reaction to the 1960 manifestations of unrest among Southern Rhodesia's Africans has been consistently repressive, other elements of the European community have reacted in a manner which reflects a profound respect for the highest standards of government and law. There can be few countries where an ex-Prime Minister had called for the suspension of a Constitution under which he held power, as Garfield Todd did in attacking the harsh governmental measures of July. There can be few countries where a respected Chief Justice has resigned in protest against the introduction of new legislation and called upon the Prime Minister to submit his resignation as well, as Federal Chief Justice Sir Robert Tredgold did when the Law and Order Act was introduced.

Southern Rhodesia's churches, Bar, University College, and press have all been outspoken in their condemnation of these new measures. Moreover, the only independent member of the Southern Rhodesian Assembly, Dr. Ahrn Palley, has demonstrated his opposition to the Act by keeping the Assembly debating his amendments to it for over 16 hours at a stretch.

All these various crosscurrents have thrown Southern Rhodesian white opinion into a turmoil. There has been a growing feeling in some quarters that the situation is getting out of hand and that the leaders of the various racial groups must do

something about it before it is too late—a feeling which produced the recent National Convention of Delegates of All Races under the chairmanship of an ex-governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir John Kennedy.

At the other end of the spectrum, some frightened whites, determined to hold on at all costs, have organized an "underground" Rhodesian Republican Army, a kind of Central African Ku Klux Klan whose activities have been directed toward intimidating European "liberals." In the midst of all this confusion and turmoil, hardly anyone has had a chance to see clearly what has produced this crisis in Southern Rhodesia and what gives a pattern to the events of the year.

NDP Begins Modestly

For the short term explanation of the events of 1960, we need go no further back than January, when the National Democratic Party was formed. Few of those who attended its inaugural meeting can have envisaged its rapid growth in size and importance.

In January, the National Democratic Party was only one of several competing African organizations and its leadership was virtually unknown. The first president was Michael Mawema, a trade unionist who had been out of the country during the 1959 emergency studying the co-operative system in Israel. The first Secretary and Treasurer was Sketchley Samkange, a young man who had previously been chairman of one of the rural branches of the African National Congress, and had been detained briefly during the emergency. He came from a distinguished African political family but had not otherwise made much mark. The first vice-president was Morton Malianga, a bookkeeper with virtually no previous political career at all.

The known African leaders were either in jail, e.g., the Congress radicals, Messrs. Chikerema, Nyandoro, and Muhsonga; or in exile, e.g., the president of Congress, Joshua Nkomo; or cautiously on the side-lines.

That first meeting was diffident, tentative, and lacking in self-confidence. But the NDP began almost immediately to gain mass support in the urban areas. It also began to attract the "intellectuals" who had hitherto remained aloof from politics—including men such as Leopold Takawira, who had for years been executive officer of the Capricorn Africa Society; Herbert Chitepo, Southern Rhodesia's only African advocate; and Ndabaningi Sithole, preacher and author.

The NDP also began to pioneer new techniques, such as the protest fast which Mr. Samkange conducted outside the Prime Minister's office against the continued detention of men arrested in February 1959. It began to make itself felt even in Britain, where more attention was given to its views

than Sir Edgar Whitehead thought reasonable.

By July, the NDP had become a sufficiently formidable force to warrant positive action by the government, and on the 19th of that month Mawema, Samkange, and Takawira were arrested. The African reaction proved that almost everyone had underestimated the strength of the NDP. Sir Edgar Whitehead might minimize the importance of the 30,000 demonstrators by claiming that many had been intimidated and others worked upon by agitators, but for the rest of the year Southern Rhodesian politics was dominated by the contest between the Southern Rhodesian Government and the NDP.

The government banned all meetings in the main African townships—a ban which in Salisbury and Bulawayo still remains in force. It resorted to the law enforcement measures and introduced the legislation which has already been described. It brought cases against the three men arrested on July 19 and against other officers of the party, by far the most important of which was Southern Rhodesia's own miniature and unpublicized version of the treason trials, in which Mr. Mawema was accused of having been an officer of an unlawful organization through his presidency of the NDP.

But despite all these restrictions and attacks, the NDP continued to grow in strength. After the July demonstrations, people began to join the party at a greatly increased rate. British interest in events in Southern Rhodesia, now thoroughly aroused, gave the NDP protection against Sir Edgar Whitehead's inclination to ban the organization outright. By the time of the first party congress in October, delegates felt strong enough to defy the government by electing as president the exiled Joshua Nkomo.

Nkomo Returns

By November, the Southern Rhodesian Government had been forced to change its plans. Although the long Mawema case ended with a decision in favor of the prosecution's allegation that Mr. Mawema had been a member of an unlawful organization, the government did not follow this up by taking further action against the NDP. Instead, Mr. Nkomo was allowed to return on Sunday, November 20, to receive a welcome from thousands of Africans which reminded observers of the welcome given Dr. Banda on his return to Nyasaland. Faced with British pressure to recognize the leaders of African opinion and with the danger of another outburst of popular protest if the NDP were again attacked, the government chose to rely upon its new powers and to tolerate the existence of the NDP.

This, then, was the great contest that precipitated and shaped the sen-

(Continued on page 10)

Three Views of Africa

● From Israel

● From India

● From Moscow

Israel's Political Stake in Africa

(From the *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*)

WHEN Israel made its first "leap into Africa" some three or four years ago, it was largely inspired by the opportunist consideration of circumventing the Arab diplomatic and political boycott, and, to a much lesser extent, perhaps also the economic pressures of the Arab League. But conditions have now changed. What may have started as a temporary and somewhat opportunist expedient has now developed a momentum of its own; it has become a policy in its own right.

That is not to say that everything is now plain sailing where Israel's future relations with Africa are concerned. Far from it. But what is clear now is that Israel has committed itself to an African policy which is bound to play a major role in its development during the second decade. It is no longer either a political curiosity or a diplomatic luxury; it is no longer the attractive window dressing for an otherwise fairly unexciting foreign policy. All this has changed. Africa has become one of the principal investments of Israeli foreign policy, and as such it must now be considered.

In 35 Countries

There are now 680 Israeli specialists and advisers serving in 35 countries and territories of Africa and Asia, and another 90 are to join them soon. The International Assistance and Cooperation Division of the Israeli Foreign Ministry is preparing to send 500 experts a year to the countries of Asia and Africa in addition to those sent by other bodies, and preparations are being completed to receive some thousand students a year from these countries at Israeli institutions, universities, schools and settlements. Over 450 have already arrived and another 200 are due shortly.

This new development is, however, attended by new problems, both in Israel and in Africa. One of the most important, it has become clear, is the whole question of education. It is important that Israelis going to Africa and Asia, and those dealing with the Afro-Asian students in Israel, should be fully trained and educated for this service. This applies especially to those who will hold important foreign service or technical jobs in Africa. They must, in time, be fully conversant with the local language, local culture, and local economics.

This cannot be done overnight. It is a long-term project that may not bring its rewards until the next generation, but it must be started now. Indeed, some of the reports we have been receiving from those African countries where Israelis are playing a considerable part suggest that not only is there a need for long-term planning and the shorter-term and more restricted work done by the Histadrut's Afro-Asian Center, but there is also an urgent need for a kind of crash-program for dealing with the immediate situation.

Cultural Advisors Needed

There is an immediate need—especially in Africa—for some sort of cultural and educational advisers to be attached to Israeli embassies. Their work ought to be mainly among the local students and teachers; not to do propaganda but to help them with advice and with the necessary tools. A recent survey of the reading matter available at the local universities has revealed a lamentable absence of balance—largely as a result of the very active "cultural" activities of teachers and propagandists from the United Arab Republic.

Also, these reports show that the greatest care will have to be taken in the selection of specialists and workers going to Africa. There is already a tendency among Israelis and their families to reconstruct the former British pattern of living apart from the local people in their closed-in communities, with their children attending their own special schools. Also, in these new countries, the wives of officials and specialists should be trained to do some kind of social or other work, but on the whole it has been found that bachelors are preferable and integrate much easier.

Trial and Error Costly

These may seem to be trivial matters, but it is by them that the British, the French, and the Americans were judged in the end—and Israel cannot afford such trial and error practice. She can learn from the experience of the others. That she can do remarkable things is being shown in Sierra Leone, where the Histadrut Contracting Company, *Solel Boneh*, has undertaken a job which every other country has turned down: to build a new Parliament in six months.

The young Israelis who are carrying out the contract have launched into the work with such verve and

II

India Reexamines Its African Ties

(From *The Economist*)

energy that they have infected the country with their enthusiasm and excitement. They are working day and night, on the site and in the architect's offices, in this race against time. It is symbolic of much more that is happening and can be made to happen in Africa. But to be successful in the

long run and avoid the failures of the great empires will require careful and thorough preparations and training and a new, informed, and understanding approach. This alone, not propaganda or self-praise, will be the deciding factor in Israel's leap into Africa.

SLOWLY, but at least less impulsively than in the halcyon Bandung days, India is developing a new African policy, critical as well as constructive. This time the African policy does not begin in India, as was the case some years ago when an ambitious school for African studies was opened in the University of Delhi. That experiment was a dismal failure. It was never clear what African studies constituted for this purpose. Many of the African students who came had no precise purpose and did not find congenial Indian company; some of them proclaimed this loudly at a meeting of the Delhi Rotary Club two years ago. Now, however, the emphasis has shifted away from mere fellow-feeling, from the illusion that there was an inevitable union between India and Africa because color and colonialism provided an unbreakable bond for all time. What are the new signs that Indians are beginning to appreciate the real, as distinguished from what might be called the emotional, historical approach to Indo-African friendship?

How Much in Common?

In the first place, it is no longer lightly assumed that Asian and African interests are identical. Indeed, so far as allocations of economic aid are concerned, the view has grown markedly in Delhi in the last six months that India will have to compete with Africa for resources both from the United Nations and from friendly nations in the West, not excluding Russia. Secondly, the idea that Africa, because it was one continent, was one people (like the illusion that Asia was essentially one because it was united against western colonialism) is dying, though it is dying hard. The differences of opinion in newly independent states, particularly Ghana, Congo, and Nigeria, show that Africa has as many complexions as it has prime ministers. Which nationalism represents the heart of Africa—Mr. Lumumba's, Dr. Nkrumah's, or that of Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa?

In point of fact, India is very much closer to the Nigerian approach than to Mr. Lumumba's. But current pressures have somewhat inverted the reflection of Indian opinion in the international mind. Because Mr. Lumumba has come under attack from the West—particularly as it is believed in India that the Belgians are still very powerful—a good deal of Indian opinion is pro-Lumumba and,

apparently, less favorable to the Nigerian approach. In substance, however, this is merely a temporary position, necessarily taken by a champion of colored peoples under stress. Nigeria is not facing any crisis and, therefore, arouses no special sympathy. Mr. Lumumba may have been unwise but, firstly, he was regarded as still fighting colonialism; secondly, he was fighting with apparent parliamentary support. The latter is a very powerful argument with India's Prime Minister and the Congress Party, who are deeply afraid of military dictatorship as in Pakistan. To Indian minds, if the verdict of an elected parliament can be brushed aside, then the way lies open not merely for military dictatorship but for a disruption of all democratic processes, including the possibility that neutrality in the international sphere might come under cold war pressures and succumb.

The question remains how great Indian influence can be in this area. The speed with which freedom has come in both the British and French colonies has taken skeptical Indian theorists by surprise. As a consequence, Indians are inadequately prepared for a situation in which India is vitally interested; although at one time an important document was prepared in Delhi to this end. The new personalities who preside over the destinies of the new states are almost completely unknown, and the states themselves are hardly better judged. And an attempt to fill the vacuum by a rush operation has been sorely hindered by lack of personnel on the diplomatic, and even more on the trade side. The decision to send some fairly senior members of India's foreign service to represent it in Africa is the best that can be done.

Economic Ties Limited

It is still not clear how much economic cooperation there can be. The successful cotton mill opened by the Birlas in Ethiopia is the only instance of an Indian foreign collaboration arrangement in Africa, and there is general recognition that the area is too large and too strategic to be held back in its development by the exclusion of Europeans. The Indian idea is that Europeans should be allowed to operate freely in Africa, but that it must remain predominantly administered by African interests, with Asians and Europeans equal partners in new economic development. It is extremely unlikely, in fact, that equality in such a partnership could

III

Nigeria As Seen From Moscow

(By Helmut Sonnenfeldt, lecturer
on Soviet Affairs, School of
Advanced International Studies)

be maintained, since Europe and America will supply practically all the capital. Both official policy and much non-official opinion are in favor of western foreign investment such as obtains in India where capital enters under government control. So long as these controls are deemed reasonable in India, they would be deemed reasonable for Africa.

There is a little uneasiness as to how the richer nations will view the future importance of India and Asia as against the claims of Africa. There is a genuine fear in India that the West would prefer an area of smaller population and less organization where it could exercise greater power than in Asia where, by and large, Asians are completely in control. There was probably some ground years ago for the view that British

business would prefer Kenya to India in certain fields such as tea plantations. There is ground for the view that the Dutch, after their bitter Indonesian experience, will always prefer Africa to Indonesia. All this, however, does not mean any diversion of the inevitable course of history in which Asia will naturally emerge, perhaps 20 or 25 years from now, an equal partner with Europe and America in the making of great international decisions. This is why there has been much interest among Indians in the suggestion that Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the retiring British high commissioner in India, is contemplating a book in which, it is believed, he will set in proper context the rising importance of Asia as a new anvil on which these major international decisions may be forged.

MOSCOW observed the coming of Nigerian independence in routine fashion, with little fanfare and clearly without great optimism. The Soviet delegation to the ceremonies included a non-Russian Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, S. M. Arushanyan, and the Deputy Foreign Minister and longtime Ambassador to the UK, Y. A. Malik. Their activities in Nigeria received scant notice in the Soviet press (and, incidentally, virtually none in the Nigerian press). TASS merely reported factually about the Soviet group's travels to the Eastern and Western Regions. It became known subsequently that the Soviet delegation had attempted to obtain agreement for the establishment of diplomatic relations in a talk with Federation Prime Minister Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.

Khrushchev Woos

Khrushchev's congratulatory message, published in *Pravda* on October 1 but unmentioned in the Lagos press for two weeks, officially recognized Nigeria, proposed establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of diplomatic representatives, and cited the independence of the most populous African country as a further sign of the inevitable collapse of the "shameful colonial system."

Two days later, in a talk with two Nigerian students in New York, Khrushchev added the thought that political independence was no more than the beginning of the struggle and, in seeming criticism of Nigeria's leadership, urged that new countries should be led by "people who would indeed defend the interests of their people rather than the privileges of the colonialists."

Brief articles in *Pravda*, *Izvestiya* and *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* and radio commentaries also made the usual Soviet distinction between mere political and "real" independence. *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, whose Eng-

lish-language edition *International Affairs* is presumably available to Nigerian readers, mentioned the special need in Nigeria to solve the problem of "feudal-tribal survivals" which, according to the Soviet author, are being exploited by the imperialists.

Embassy Suggested

Nigeria's admission to the UN took place on October 7, Sir Abubakar having flown to New York. In the Security Council, Moscow of course voted for admission. In the General Assembly's traditional welcoming ceremony, the Soviets contented themselves with letting Byelorussian delegate Mazurov speak briefly for the whole Bloc toward the end of the list of speakers. The event commanded 14 lines in *Izvestiya*, while *Pravda* reported Sir Abubakar's speech in one sentence to the effect that Nigeria did not intend to join any blocs and had no designs on other countries. The Nigerian Prime Minister's affirmation of friendship for the British and expression of pride in Nigeria's being a member of the Commonwealth, as well as his moderate discussion of the Congo situation and of other issues, was not reported.

Sir Abubakar apparently discussed the question of diplomatic relations with Khrushchev at a dinner in New York, and Khrushchev may well have been irritated by the discussion. Sir Abubakar himself reported on the status of this matter in a statement on his return to Lagos on October 12. According to the Prime Minister, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Malik had first raised the subject at the time of the independence celebrations, stating that Khrushchev's letter of congratulations should be regarded as a formal application for a Soviet Embassy in Nigeria. Sir Abubakar at that time responded that it was his policy to give Commonwealth countries first consideration, followed by countries with consulates in Nigeria

(Continued on next page)

before independence; other nations, such as the USSR, would come next and their applications would be considered on merit. Sir Abubakar said he told Malik that the Khrushchev letter did not constitute a formal request in accordance with Nigerian policy and with the established method for applying. Evidently, Sir Abubakar took a similar line in his talk with Khrushchev in New York, telling him to make an application "in the normal way."

There can be little question that Sir Abubakar's attitude—in effect he seemed to be telling the Soviets to queue up for their embassy—must have rankled. Nevertheless, Moscow could scarcely wish to be without representation in a country that was bound to grow in influence in Africa and elsewhere in the world, that was officially committed to non-alignment, and that contained substantial elements favoring a reduction in Western influence.

Soviet Reactions Vary

It is a peculiarity of Soviet behavior that a minor irritant or slight can, in one set of circumstances, evoke the most violently hostile response, while another time the Soviet skin is so thick that nothing will deter pursuit of a desired objective. One need only remember Khrushchev's sudden cancellation of a scheduled trip to Scandinavia in 1959, ostensibly because of some hostile press articles, and contrast this with both his first and his second trips to the United States in the face of well-publicized hostility from many sections of US opinion. In the Nigerian case, the desirability of opening and developing relations obviously outweighs any resentment occasioned by Sir Abubakar's rather formalistic conditions. In any case, on November 11, a brief notice in the Moscow press reported that Foreign Minister Gromyko had sent a letter (no date was given) to Sir Abubakar "making an official proposal to consider the question of the establishment of a Soviet embassy in Lagos." Gromyko offered reciprocal opening of a Nigerian Embassy in Moscow, stated that such an exchange of embassies would strengthen friendly relations between the two countries and suggested Accra or London as the preferred locale of talks to iron out practical problems connected with the opening of the missions.

The Nigerians have not appeared in any hurry to respond to what obviously constituted compliance with Sir Abubakar's requirements; but there is no doubt that they will do so in time and that diplomatic relations will be established.

Publicly, Moscow meanwhile began to look more closely and critically at internal developments in Nigeria. In *Pravda's* first major article on Nigeria since independence, Orestov—writing from Accra—on November 19 reported that the Nigerian public

was closely watching the first steps of its government and "is ready to help rectify [the government's] mistakes with sound criticism." On the plus side, Orestov cited Sir Abubakar's statement on non-participation in blocs and on friendship with all countries, Nigeria's support for Congo independence and its vote "for the Cuban complaint" against the US in the UN. (The vote actually was on inscription of the complaint in the agenda.)

But the bulk of the article dealt with a demand by the National Vanguard, a loose affiliate of the NCNC, for the dismissal of Sir Abubakar's British private secretary on the grounds that he was interfering in the running of the country and humiliating the Nigerian leaders; with the Vanguard's protest against the agreement accepting a US space tracking station for Project Mercury; with public demands for greater "Nigerianization"; and with the demand of an unspecified NCNC leader for nationalization of major industries. Orestov, ostensibly quoting the "Nigerian press", complained that the "good will of the public found no response among the leaders of the government." He concluded by quoting the NCNC's *West African Pilot* to the effect that Sir Abubakar must prove that his government is friendly towards the USSR and the Soviet people, and that there should be Soviet representation in Lagos.

Focus on the West

Moscow's desire to establish diplomatic relations—almost certainly to be followed by offers of trade and economic and technical support (there are reportedly less than a dozen Nigerian students at Soviet institutions at the moment)—is clearly aimed at cultivating anti-Western forces and demonstrating to the government the benefits of "positive neutrality." In Soviet terms, such neutrality involves not only verbal affirmations of non-alignment or even periodic anti-Western votes in the UN. Rather, its positiveness consists in concrete political and other relations with the USSR and in, at least occasionally, openly anti-Western initiatives.

Before long, Moscow might find itself faced with a delicate problem of adjusting its policies to a competition for influence between Nigeria and other ambitious West African states, notably Ghana. For the moment, Moscow would have little difficulty siding with Ghana or Guinea as against Nigeria. If and as Soviet relations with Nigeria quicken, however, Soviet choices may become more difficult. Given its size, large population, economic potential, relative governmental efficiency as well as the political maturity of a number of its leaders, Nigeria is bound to assume an increasingly powerful role in African affairs. Despite its obvious displeasure with the orientation of Sir

Abubakar's leadership, Moscow clearly regards Nigeria as a key area in which to build its own role; and it has begun the process. In the longer run, it may well regard Nigeria as more important than either Ghana or Guinea as a focus of Soviet influence on African affairs—though the goal of Soviet policy will undoubtedly be to cultivate all three and indeed any country on the continent that proves receptive.

Southern Rhodesia: 1961 Trouble Spot?

(Continued from page 6)

sational events of 1960. But it still remains to be explained why the NDP achieved such support from among the Africans of Southern Rhodesia, who have been heretofore so passive politically. It should be noted that the NDP has not created this African political concern; indeed, it has not even succeeded in completely canalizing it.

The numerous strikes and riots of 1960 have not been NDP-inspired. They have been expressions of a vague but profound economic, social, and political discontent among the African people of Southern Rhodesia.

The causes of this are many and go back many years. Population pressure in the Reserves and other African areas, which amount to less than half the total area of the Colony, has resulted in fragmentation and erosion and consequent government action to limit the number of land holdings. This has accelerated the tendency towards a more permanent move to the towns; but there has not been enough employment in the towns nor have wages been high enough to support settled family life there. There has been a serious shortage of urban housing, which has nowhere near been solved. The management of urban locations has been based upon the old "single" migrant labor system and is infinitely irksome for the more permanent resident of the towns. Unemployment, hunger, poverty—all these classic causes of popular discontent are present in Southern Rhodesia today.

Then there are the educated and the half educated Africans, bitter because they are denied the opportunities which have been displayed to them, and forced into a solidarity with their poorer fellows by discriminatory legislation and practice. Today there is greater African discontent than ever before, despite all the apparent advances that have been made in Southern Rhodesia. And this discontent is vocalized and dignified by the influence of the pan-Africanist ideal and by the example of successful independence movements elsewhere. It is this great complex of feelings that

(Continued on page 15)

African Leaders Convene at Rival "Summits"

Two "summit" conferences in Brazzaville and Casablanca this month gave a degree of formal status to two poles that have developed in intra-African politics since the development of the Congo crisis in mid-1960. Both the Casablanca Conference of January 4-7 and the December 24 announcement of the formal "union" of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali are seen by most observers as a reaction to the steps taken toward consolidation of Africa's more conservative French-speaking states at Brazzaville earlier in December. Indeed, the communique issued by Presidents Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, and Modibo Keita at the end of their meeting in Conakry just before Christmas specifically condemned "all regrouping of African states based on the languages of colonial states" and appealed to "these Chiefs of State to return to a healthier and higher conception of African unity." Situated in a still-flexible position between the two extremes of African opinion represented by the Brazzaville Twelve and the Casablanca Five are such key independent operators as Nigeria, Ethiopia, Liberia, Tunisia, and Togo.

IN Brazzaville (capital of the "other" Congo Republic), the heads of 12 French-speaking African states met from December 15-19 in the second of three projected meetings aimed at developing a common foreign policy, more intensive economic and cultural cooperation, a permanent secretariat, pooled diplomatic representation, and, some said, a common defense organization. Western-oriented neutralism was the course charted by the Brazzaville conferees, whose countries were all formerly governed by France, and are the continuing recipients of large-scale French economic assistance.

The new formation is sparked by Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouët-Boigny and includes Senegal, Dahomey, Niger, Cameroun, Chad, (French) Congo Republic, Gabon, the Central African Republic, Mauritania, the Voltaic Republic, and the Malgache Republic. A third session will be held in Yaounde in March.

On critical current issues, the Twelve reached these conclusions:

- **The Congo:** Endorsed United Nations technical aid to the troubled Congo, but firmly rejected long-term UN trusteeship, political intervention by other African states, or efforts by any of the Great Powers to "recolonize the Congo either directly or indirectly." After conferring at length with President Joseph Kasavubu, President Moise Tshombe of breakaway Katanga Province, Albert Kalonji of the self-styled mining state in Kasai Province, and representatives of imprisoned Premier Patrice Lumumba, the Brazzaville states urged pressure for an internal Congolese political solution via a round-table conference.

- **Algeria:** Rejected the demand of the more militant African and Asian states for a UN referendum in Algeria, and placed their trust instead in General de Gaulle, whom they urged to initiate negotiations with the FLN and end the war in 1961.

- **Mauritania:** Agreed on "active solidarity" in pressing the campaign to get Mauritania into the UN.

IN Casablanca, the leaders of five African countries of more militantly neutralist orientation concluded a four-day conference on January 7 by appealing to "all independent African states" to join in the creation of a NATO-like organization which would coordinate the continent economically, politically, and militarily. The principal participants—King Mohammed V of Morocco and Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Modibo Keita of Mali—announced their decisions in a unanimously-adopted statement of principles to be henceforth called the "African Charter of Casablanca."

The Casablanca Charter formalizes African neutralism by pledging its signers to a "policy of nonalignment," calls for the independence of all remaining colonial territories, opposes the maintenance of foreign troops and the establishment of bases, and urges its members to rid the continent of "economic intervention and pressures."

In a separate communique on Africa's immediate problems, the Casablanca meeting called for the release of Congo Premier Lumumba and his restoration to the premiership; demanded that the UN disarm the "lawless bands" of Colonel Joseph Mobutu; urged the reconvening of the Congolese Parliament; and renewed an earlier threat to withdraw their troops—which add up to 6,500 of the total UN Congo force of 20,000—if the UN does not take action on their demands; denounced and condemned the referendum organized by France in Algeria and declared their determination to support "by all means" the nationalist rebels; and labeled Mauritania a French "puppet state." In response to strong pressure from the UAR, the leaders meeting in Casablanca also branded Israel as an "instrument of imperialism and neo-colonialism not only in the Middle East but also in Africa."

Although the conference was held behind closed doors, early reports sug-

gest that the moderating influence of Ghana's President Nkrumah was chiefly responsible for the relatively modest tone of the final resolutions. Observers noted that, contrary to early predictions, the Casablanca Five did not propose the creation of an African army to go into the Congo in support of the separatist, pro-Lumumba regime now established in Stanleyville, and did not set a specific timetable for UN compliance with their other demands. Also participating in the discussions at Casablanca, but not invited to become signatories of the Charter, were the Foreign Minister of Libya, Ferhat Abbas of the Provisional Algerian Government, and Ceylon's Ambassador to Cairo.

Soviet Veto Forestalls Mauritania's UN Bid

Mauritanian Prime Minister Moktar Ould Daddah joined his countrymen on November 28 in celebrating the desert republic's independence, then set off on what turned out to be a disappointing trip to the United Nations in New York.

In a surprise move on December 5, the Soviet Union—which had sent Prime Minister Daddah a congratulatory telegram less than a week earlier—vetoed Mauritania's admission as the 100th member of the international organization in retaliation for the Security Council's failure to honor Outer Mongolia's 14-year old bid for membership. The Western powers maintain that Outer Mongolia is actually an appendage of the USSR, while Soviet Delegate Valerian Zorin implicitly supported the Moroccan claim that Mauritania is an "artificial" state supported by France. Earlier, on November 26, the General Assembly's Political Committee had adjourned an inconclusive debate on a Moroccan claim that Mauritania was historically and ethnically part of the Moroccan Kingdom, and was being given its independence by France only in order to foil a natural union with its northern neighbor.

Ethiopian Coup Fails, But Problems Remain

Although the full story of the abortive December 14 rebellion against Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie is yet to be pieced together, two preliminary conclusions seem warranted: that it was a palace revolution organized by some of the Emperor's most trusted officials rather than by Ethiopia's considerable body of "angry young men"; and that the immediate cause of its failure was hesitant execution of a poorly-coordinated plan.

The principal organizers of the attempted coup—General Mangistou Neway, commander of the Imperial Guard, and his brother, Governor

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Girmame Neway of Jigjiga Province—have been hanged in a public square in Addis and the other known leaders are either dead or in custody, but there is a general feeling in Addis Ababa that the clock cannot now be turned back. The rebels' inexplicable slaughter of some of the best public servants in Ethiopia is only one of the lasting problems hanging over from the mutiny. Beyond this, the revolt has crystallized the dissatisfaction of Ethiopia's gradually expanding intelligentsia with the limitations imposed by life under a feudal monarchy.

Perhaps of most importance for the longer run is the emergence of the Ethiopian military as a political factor. While the actual number of officers participating in the revolt was small and largely confined to elements of the Imperial Guard, new attention is being focused on the American-trained officer corps as a potent force for unity or disunity.

Liberia Elected to Seat On Security Council

Liberia became the first sub-Saharan member of the United Nations Security Council on December 20, when the General Assembly voted to have Ireland and Liberia jointly succeed to the non-permanent seat being vacated by Italy. Under a compromise agreement reached on a fourteenth ballot and ending a six weeks deadlock between the supporters of Liberia and Portugal, Liberia will serve for half of the two-year term and then be succeeded by Ireland.

Portugal's candidacy was strenuously opposed by the African and Asian states on two counts—because of the repressive nature of Portuguese colonial policies and because of their belief that the presence of 25 African states in the UN now justifies the assignment of one of the non-permanent Security Council seats to Africa on a regular basis.

Buganda Secession May Be Chess Play

Britain's efforts to prepare its East African protectorate of Uganda for 1961 general elections and early independence hit a new snag on December 31, when the parliament of Buganda Province voted to secede from Uganda—effective at the moment 1960 became 1961. The vote, which Governor Sir Frederick Crawford hopefully described as a bargaining counter rather than an irreversible decision, underscores Buganda's demand for constitutional guarantees against the creation of a political framework which would allow popular national parties to erode the local autonomy of the traditional tribal authorities of Buganda. The Buganda Government further contends that these guarantees must be negotiated

before, rather than after, the common roll elections scheduled for March and the Uganda Constitutional Conference tentatively scheduled for London in September.

Buganda's Cambridge-educated ruler, 35-year old Kabaka Frederick Mutesa II, is part of a dynasty that goes back some 37 kings in unbroken line. His 25,390 square mile kingdom represents more than a quarter of the size of Uganda, and Buganda's cotton and coffee contributes nearly 60 percent of the total revenue of the Uganda Protectorate.

Pre-Election Tension Growing in Kenya

Election fever continued to mount in Kenya this month, as the country's voters prepared for the February 20-27 elections which will install an African majority in the Legislative Council and possibly an African as Chief Minister. The full text of the new Lancaster House Constitution for Kenya, released for publication the first week in December, does not specifically provide for an African Chief Minister, but the vagueness of the phrasing is interpreted by both Europeans and Africans in Kenya as "leaving the door open" for such an appointment if a suitable African leader should emerge from the elections.

Despite the increasingly militant character of the public statements of the various competing candidates, the actual policy differences between the Kenya African National Union and the Kenya African Democratic Union, as set forth in their election manifestos, are relatively minor. Both parties call for complete Africanization of the civil service, extensive land reform, abolition of the present day system of provincial administration, a foreign policy of friendly non-alignment, abolition of all foreign military bases in Kenya, the release of all detained and restricted persons (i.e., Jomo Kenyatta, whom both parties insist should be Kenya's first African Chief Minister), and promises of full employment, mass education, higher living standards, and rapid industrialization. (See *Africa Report*, July 1960, page 6, for organizational details of KANU and KADU).

Ethiopians and Somalis Feud on Disputed Border

Hundreds of angry Somalis marched through their capital city of Mogadiscio on January 2 and 3, demanding retaliatory action against Ethiopian troops who clashed with Somali tribesmen in the disputed Ogaden-Damot border area during the last week of December. The clashes resulted in the death of some 120 persons, most of them Somalis

killed by Ethiopian strafing planes. Heavy police guards were placed around both the Ethiopian and American Embassies, since Somali opinion is strongly critical of the United States for giving military aid to Ethiopia.

Central Africa Talks Make Little Progress

The London conference to determine the future of the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland opened on schedule December 5, but the three principal African representatives had put in only occasional attendance by the time a Christmas recess was called. The conference was convened in response to Article 99 of the 1953 federal constitution, which provides for a full-scale constitutional review "in not less than seven nor more than nine years."

Pondoland Tribesmen Riot Against Apartheid

The rioting and hut-burning which broke out again in late November in Pondoland, African reserve on the east coast of South Africa, are described by the London *Observer* as "possibly the worst setback suffered by the South African government since it embarked on its apartheid policies 12 years ago." While the government was always ready to face bitter opposition among urban Africans, it anticipated that it could depend upon the cooperation of rural tribesmen in creating the network of separate Bantustans which are the key to its separate development policy.

The government, on the other hand, charges that the riots, which appeared to be well-organized and explicitly directed against the Bantu Authorities Act, were organized by white Communist attorneys, allowed in the area to defend Africans on earlier charges. On December 22, Minister of Bantu Development De Wet Nel reiterated that at least 90 percent of the people of Pondoland favored the Bantustan System.

In Johannesburg, the Progressive Party held its second national conference in early December, and called for a set of qualified non-racial franchise proposals, which would allow somewhat greater African participation than does the existing Federal franchise of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. At present, voting in the Union is restricted to whites, except that Coloured males elect four white MPs in the 160-member House of Assembly. The Progressives, a liberal offshoot of the opposition United Party, have not yet had a chance to contest a general election, but informal indications are that their strength has grown modestly in the past year.

Africana Floods the Book Stores

By HARVEY GLICKMAN

AWO: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 316 pages, \$4.50.

Constitutional Developments in Nigeria, by Kalu Ezera, (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 274 pages, \$5.50.

Nigeria: Newest Nation, by Lois Mitchison, (N.Y.: Praeger, 1960), 122 pages, \$3.

University College Ibadan, by J. T. Saunders, (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 224 pages, \$4.50.

It is possible to detect an American identification with Nigerians which does not exist with any other peoples in Africa. Perhaps this is because Nigeria, like the United States, is sprawling, varied, bustling, and eager to be successful, and must grapple with many of the same problems we have faced in "melting" diverse ethnic groups into one nation. Moreover, the federal system adopted to contain these centrifugal forces is not unlike our own.

In the life of Chief Awolowo, Leader of the Opposition in the Nigerian Federal Assembly, the American reader will have no trouble discerning a familiar homily: thrift, determination, self-confidence, and sheer hard work reward their practitioners with honor, wealth, and influence. From one who literally hewed wood and drew water (to pay for his schooling), Chief Awolowo rose to become Prime Minister of the Western Region. In the constitutional development of Nigeria, as recorded by Dr. Ezera in the second book noted above, Americans will readily follow the search for a viable political framework, one that will achieve stability, guarantee effective administration, and protect the rights of minorities. The author of this study was educated in the United States and currently holds a lectureship in Government at University College, Ibadan.

Awo Censures Authoritarians

In the course of an intriguing account of his early struggles—he was, successively, a clerk, a merchant, a typist, a journalist, a contractor, a lawyer, an author, and a politician—Chief Awolowo demonstrates an abiding detestation of arbitrary power, whether it be schoolboy bullies, pompous tutors, rabble rousing politicians, or the British administration. Indeed he berates "a new-fangled theory" that apologizes for the reduction of democracy in Africa to a form of caesarist populism.

Awolowo calls himself a nationalist—"democrat by nature and socialist by conviction"—but his background

and career blunt the edges of these terms. In fact, he turns out to be an unusual sort of rebel. He believes that people on top ought to deserve their positions. "In normal circumstances, each of us is where he is because of his size and weight," he notes. (This comes from one of two books that shaped the Chief's philosophy of life, a Coue-type manual, *It's Up to You*.) His principal quarrel with British rule was not that it was alien or imposed, but that it had not sufficient regard for opinions among the governed. Finally, Awolowo's resolve seems to stem from his confidence in the destiny of men of his station—his ancestors on both sides held secondary titles and his father was an early convert to Christianity.



Thus Chief Awolowo emerges as a conservative. Throughout his guided tour of the maze of Nigerian politics (more background would have helped the discussion, as the motives, reasons, and official positions of parties and their leaders sometimes sink from sight), one apparent thread is his shrewd eye for what is practical. His assessment of the successful government hinges on its provision of welfare, much as a Churchill might view the question. In fact, his definition of democracy is a quote directly from Churchill.

Dr. Ezera, on the other hand, is a "Zikist," which for Nigerian purposes makes him a radical nationalist. He tries to mask his entirely un-offensive partisanship by carefully reviewing all sides of all questions, but Dr. Azikiwe and his party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, always somehow emerge as the heroes of Nigeria's advance to independence.

Although he generally sticks faithfully to his constitutional knitting, restricting digressions to hints and conclusions to mere summations, Dr. Ezera does identify clearly the crucial problems in the development of stability and democracy in Nigeria: the maintenance of an impartial and

politically subservient civil service, the reduction of political corruption, and the compromising of the demands as well as fears of minority groups.

It is extremely difficult to compress political development into a succession of debates over formal structure; nevertheless, Dr. Ezera has accomplished a remarkable feat, especially so soon after the events, in mapping the forces at work at critical stages in his country's political progress.

In describing the process of unification Dr. Ezera gives full credit to the British contribution. When Nigerian politicians in all regions in the early 1950's made extravagant demands on each other, some openly advocating secession, it was British insistence on cooperation that won out.

"National Core" Weak

Federalism remains a scaffolding for the construction of a Nigerian nation. The "national core" of the Nigerian Federation is still weak, due not to constitutional structure, but to the persistence of geographic diversity, ethnic suspicion, and a consequent different governing party in each of the Regions. While the central government possesses strictly enumerated powers, it also shares with the Regions extensive concurrent powers. Dr. Ezera observes that the central government "could assume legally huge proportions if [it] is dynamic and bold enough to exert firm leadership." Yet, for example, in matters of economic development, which all Nigerians regard as paramount, the Regions have taken the lead. As a result, Dr. Ezera argues, they have sharpened the differences in levels of achievement, thus deepening the gulf that separates the Regions and, hence, inhibited the growth of a strong national loyalty. Nigeria's chief guarantee of constitutional democracy—geographic, ethnic and political divisions—is simultaneously its greatest threat to stability.

Miss Mitchison, in the third book noted at the beginning of this section, rounds out this introduction to Nigeria by offering general readers a Gunther-type survey that cuts a few corners, yet demonstrates a keen reportorial eye for the main sights and ideas. In her brief ruminative moments, she can be bitingly suggestive. For instance, she notes that the color problem is noticed least among the young managerial types of both races, possibly because they are powerfully linked in their common concern for pecuniary success.

For readers who wish to pursue a theme on which all observers agree—Nigeria's passion for education—Dr. Saunders provides a subdued outline of the rise of University College. He

should know, for he was its second Principal.

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The Lost Cities of Africa, by Basil Davidson, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), 366 pages, \$6.50.

Nigerian Perspectives, an Historical Anthology, by Thomas Hodgkin, (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1960), 340 pages, \$4.80.

Borrioboola-Gha, The Story of Lokoja, the First British Settlement in Nigeria, by Howard J. Pedraza, (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1960), 118 pages, \$2.90.

Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria, by John E. Flint, (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1960), 340 pages, \$4.80.

A hundred years or so after Park and Clapperton, Stanley and Livingstone, *et al*, geographically discovered Africa, it is being discovered again, but this time by the historians. Although the myth that Africans are "peoples without a past" dies hard, there should be no excuse for the interested observer to retain that fancy after examining the contributions of Basil Davidson and Thomas Hodgkin.

Basing his account on recent archaeological discoveries, Mr. Davidson—a journalist who has written about China, Germany, Yugoslavia and twice previously about Africa—pieces together a fragmentary, but convincing, story of some nine or ten centuries of African "civilization" before the European assault. Interestingly enough, Mr. Davidson finds the pulverization of native African cultures largely accomplished by Portuguese slaving and political ruthlessness before the rest of Europe arrived, so to speak.

So intent, however, is Mr. Davidson on showing that Africa's story "is no different in its essence from the story of any of the major families of man" that he occasionally overstates his case. For instance, can we really claim that there was an authentic, native "Swahili culture"? And isn't it stretching things to call Meroe, the fifth century capital of Kush (near Khartoum), the "Athens of Africa"?

Mr. Hodgkin, perhaps the most perceptive writer today on West African affairs, makes no such grandiose claims. While Mr. Davidson writes brilliantly for the general reader, Mr. Hodgkin addresses the serious student. His book appears in the "West African History Series," facilitated by the largesse of the West African Newspapers Group. The series includes biographies of "the founders," such as that of Sir George Goldie, brief lives of little-known leaders in various ages, and collections of the descriptions of travellers, explorers, and diplomats illustrative of the history of West African peoples. In editing and introducing one of the latter offerings Mr. Hodgkin has compiled the reports

of Arab geographers, indigenous writers, and European travellers, mainly from the ninth to the nineteenth century. The result is the clearest picture yet of the background to modern Nigeria.

As the author notes, the anthology "is conceived in three dimensions:" in time, illustrating the ways things change; in space, embracing five major groupings of peoples that have inhabited what is now Nigeria; and in culture, illustrating various aspects of the life of these peoples in the pre-colonial period. The focus is on Africans—"the 'invaders' are only interesting from the standpoint of their impact on the indigenous peoples."

In addition to enlarging and deepening the refutation of the myth of the peoples without a past, the sources collected disprove another myth—that these societies were static or immobile before the coming of the white man. Large groups migrated, Islam spread, commercial city-states arose and flourished, kingdoms expanded and disintegrated and a Fulani *jihad* swept over a vast area—and all before 1900. Mr. Hodgkin has produced a very rewarding book, down to the last map and illustration.

European Era Seems Austere

After a journey through Africa's pre-colonial past, the European impact seems austere by comparison. Dr. Flint performs a difficult task admirably in tracing the Royal Niger Company through the shoals and eddies of European power politics, diplomacy, and commerce in West Africa. Goldie, the founder and guiding spirit of the Company, deliberately destroyed his private papers—the crowning incredibility in a fantastic career—thus preventing any definitive assessment of his work, although one has no trouble in characterizing him as extraordinarily bold and unscrupulous. Still, his ultimate influence in "making" Nigeria seems negligible or, at best, cloudy.

"Borrioboola-Gha" is the African settlement that Mrs. Jellyby in Charles Dickens' *Bleak House* worried about, overlooking her own palpable misfortunes. Dickens chose this way to ridicule Victorian philanthropy. The settlement existed; it was Lokoja and Mr. Pedraza spent five years in or near it as a District Officer. He attempts to compress 100 years of British experience in Nigeria into an outline story of the settlement, which he calls, rather infelicitously, "the germ of Nigeria." It is an incredible tale of high ideals—"the extinction of the slave trade and the civilization of Africa," wild naivete—the first expedition prepared for all possibilities, including meeting any wandering tribes of Jews; and deep tragedy—the first two expeditions perished from malaria.

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1. Beginning a New Year's roundup of recent noteworthy articles in "non-Africanist" periodicals:

Edward Shils, "Political Development in the New States, I, II," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 2, no. 3, 4, April, July 1960. An attempt to lay out a general theory of political development, treating the properties, the determinants, and alternative courses of evolution of new states. A seminal work. The same author focuses on stages of social and political change and contributory patterns of development among intellectuals in "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," *World Politics*, vol. 12, no. 3, April 1960.

Elliot J. Berg, "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 54, no. 2, June 1960. An outline of the economic factors underlying political and constitutional development. The author finds powerful economic reasons for the French colonies' acquiescence in dependence, their demand for independence, and their attempts to confederate.

Rene Lemarchand, "Selective Bibliographical Survey for the Study of Politics in the former Belgian Congo," *Ibid.*, no. 3, September 1960. An invaluable beginning; the first of its kind in English.

Robert A. LeVine, "Anti-European Violence in Africa: a Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 3, no. 4, 1959. Seeks a basis for explaining anti-white violence in behavior theory. "The more the behavior of the European-run government arouses in the African population conflicting expectations regarding their political autonomy, the greater the probability of an outbreak of African violence directed at European lives and property."

Daniel M. Friedenberg, "An Economic View of Negro African Independence," *Dissent*, vol. 7, no. 2, Spring 1960. A neo-Marxist interpretation of decolonization, predicting that influence blocs in Africa will crystallize around culture areas and that the degree of influence will vary directly with the level of cultural achievement. So the future center of Negro African power is the Guinea coast.

Eric Stokes, "Great Britain and Africa: the Myth of Imperialism," *History Today*, vol. 10, no. 8, August 1960. Contends that British policy throughout the nineteenth century maintained a continuous goal: the protection of British commercial and humanitarian enterprise. Defensive strategy and not economics underlay the acquisition of territory in Africa.

Leo Silberman, "The 'Mad' Mullah: Hero of Somali Nationalism," *Ibid.* A popular review, replete with pictures redolent of the era, of the unbelievable exploits of Sayed Mohamed Abdullah Hassan al Mahdi, who fought the British, the Ethiopians, the Italians, and numerous Somali tribes, 1899-1920.

A. H. Hanson, "Public Enterprise

in Nigeria, I: Federal Public Utilities; II: Development Corporations," *Public Administration* (London), vol. 36, 37, Winter 1958, Spring 1959. Detailed tracing of the "rather dismal record" of Development Corporations in inducing economic growth, due *inter alia* to "administrative recklessness" and "bureaucratic top-heaviness." Although the verdict on public utilities is more favorable, it has yet to be proven that they can do better than government departments.

William J. Barber, "Economic Rationality and Behavior Patterns in an Underdeveloped Area: a Case Study of African Economic Behavior in the Rhodesias," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 8, no. 3, April 1960. An examination of production and wage patterns, concluding that Africans behave "rationally" in the midst of a system that maximizes their insecurity.

Dan Jacobson, "Return to South Africa," *Commentary*, vol. 30, no. 1, July 1960. A sensitive perusal of the elements that support the *status quo* in South Africa today—creeping stagnation, lethargy, and greed.

A batch of sociological studies shed light on a number of limited areas: Kenneth Little, "The West African Town: its Social Basis," *Diogenes*, no. 29, Spring 1960; Robert LeVine, "The Internationalization of Political Values in Stateless Societies," *Human Organization*, vol. 19, no. 2, Summer 1960; E. R. Yeld, "Islam and Social Stratification in Northern Nigeria," *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 11, June 1960; T. Peter Omari, "Changing Attitudes of Students in West African Society Toward Marriage and Family Relationships," *Ibid.*, September 1960.

Dennis Austin and William Tordoff, "Voting in an African Town," *Political Studies* (London), vol. 8, no. 2, June 1960. An investigation in Kumasi that shows communal voting stronger in the United Party than in the Convention Peoples Party and non-voting the result of "cross-presures."

International Affairs (London) continues its policy of printing speeches delivered to the Royal Institute. Especially useful for introductory purposes are: Sekou Toure, "The Republic of Guinea," Sir Edgar Whitehead, "Southern Rhodesia," vol. 36, no. 2, June 1960; C. C. Harris, "Tanganyika Today," no. 1, January 1960.

"Why Belgium Quit the Congo," *Fortune*, November 1960. A critical look at the forces within Belgium that crystallized around the policy of withdrawal. The fear of "another Algeria," coupled with a surprising paucity of political strength or acumen among the mining and commercial interests help explain the quick collapse of a long-standing policy.

Alan Moorehead, "The Fountains of the Nile," *New Yorker*, September

24, 31, October 6, 1960. A sympathetic recitation of the story of Burton, Speke, and Grant and the exploration of the source of the White Nile. High adventure, smoothly told—part of forthcoming book.

Joseph Kraft, "The Untold Story of the UN's Congo Army," *Harper's Magazine*, November 1960. In addition to clarifying the main stream of events in the whirlpool of diplomatic feints and maneuvers in the UN, the author reveals the Secretary-General as a shrewd politician who created an African lobby for his policy.

2. *Migrants and Proletarians, Urban Labor in the Economic Development of Uganda*, by Walter Elkan, (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1960), 149 pages, \$3.40.

Plantation and Village in the Cameroons, Some Economic and Social Studies, by Edwin Ardener, Shirley Ardener, W. A. Warmington, (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1960), 435 pages, \$8.

Largely for students and experts, both books stress the importance of raising the productivity of agriculture to achieve balanced development.

3. *The Public Service in the New States, A Study in Some Trained Manpower Problems*, by Kenneth Younger, (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1960), 113 pages, \$2.60.

A surprisingly technical work on the problem of attracting and retaining civil servants, by the Director-General of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Relying mainly on evidence from Nigeria and Ghana, he stresses the need for UN machinery to coordinate the placement of personnel in the new states.

4. *Consciences Tribales et Nationales en Afrique Noire*, by Fernand van Langenhove, (Brussels and the Hague: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales and Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 468 pages, 400 F.B.

A rather formal study of the social forces underlying patterns of transformation of tribalism into nationalism. Professor van Langenhove, former permanent representative of Belgium to the UN, blends his experience of international affairs with his knowledge of sociology and politics and is particularly valuable on Belgian sources and developments in the Congo. He finds the new nationalism a combination of the classic demand for freedom and an ethnic and racial revolt.

5. *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa*, by Leo Marquard, (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1960), 247 pages, \$3.

An enlarged and revised version of an excellent introduction to South African social and political problems. The author concludes that some progress toward moderation can be detected, but will not go very far until South Africans "ask the right ques-

tion: how can we spread European civilization?" and not "how can we save white supremacy?" Clear, balanced and indispensable.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED:

1. *Kossoh Town Boy*, by Robert Wellesley Cole, (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 191 pages, \$2.75. Growing up in Sierra Leone.

2. *The Passport of Mallam Ilia*, by Cyprian Ekwensi, (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 80 pages, 75¢.

The Drummer Boy, by Cyprian Ekwensi, (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 87 pages, 75¢.

Two books for Nigerian youngsters by one of Nigeria's outstanding writers.

3. *Faces Looking Up*, by Mina Lewiton, (N.Y.: Harper, 1960), 153 pages, \$2.95. Children's book about going to school in 12 different countries.

4. *This Side Jordan*, by Margaret Laurence, (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1960), 304 pages, \$4.50. Novel of Ghana's society in transition.

5. *Directory of the Federation of Nigeria 1960*, (London: Diplomatic Press and Publishing Co., 1960), 212 pages, 30s. Source book that includes a who's who.

6. *Ghana and the New Africa*, by Douglas Warner, (London: Muller, 1960), 181 pages, 15s. A journalist surveys life and politics in present-day Ghana.

7. *Afro-Asian Revolutions*, by Raya Dunayevskaya, (Detroit: News and Letters Pamphlet, 1959), 28 pages, 25¢. Emphasizes "the new elemental force of Marxist Humanism."

8. *Africa in Paperbacks*, 199 Paperback Books on Africa South of the Sahara in Print, May 1960, by Douglas C. Kelley, (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Bureau of Social and Political Research, 1960), 37 pages. Single copies available free from World Affairs Continuing Education, 403 Library, M.S.U., East Lansing.

Southern Rhodesia: 1961 Trouble Spot?

(Continued from page 10)

gives the NDP its strength, and which also accounts for the riots and disturbances of the year.

It cannot be doubted that this mass of economic and social grievance is a formidable problem for any government, whether white, as now, or black as undoubtedly in the future. But it cannot be doubted either that, through incomprehension, the present government has needlessly and consistently inflamed an already tense situation. The problem cannot be solved within the context of the present distribution of economic and social power.

African Ambassadors To The United States

(Washington chanceries listed
if yet established)

Cameroun: Ambassador Aime Raymond N'Thepe, 2825 Normanstone Drive NW, Washington, DC.

Central African Republic: Ambassador Michel Gallin Douathe.

Chad: Ambassador Mahamat Kriga.

Congo (Brazzaville): Ambassador Emanuel Dadet.

Gabon: Ambassador Joseph N'goua.

Dahomey: Ambassador Louis Ignacio Pinto.

Ethiopia: Ambassador Mikael Imru, 2134 Kalorama Road NW, Washington, DC.

Ghana: Ambassador William M. Q. Halm, 2139 R Street NW, Washington, DC.

Guinea: Ambassador Telli Boubacar Diallo, 2112 Leroy Place NW, Washington, DC.

Ivory Coast: Ambassador Konan Bedie, 2424 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

Liberia: Ambassador George A. Padmore, 5201 16th Street NW, Washington, DC.

Libya: Ambassador (Dr.) Mohied-dine Fekini, 2127 Bancroft Place NW, Washington, DC.

Malagasy Republic: Ambassador Louis Rakotomalala, 1725 Eye Street NW, Washington, DC.

Mali: Ambassador Adoulaye Maiga, 2131 R Street NW, Washington, DC.

Morocco: Ambassador (Dr.) El-Mehdi Ben Aboud, 2144 Wyoming Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

Niger: Ambassador Noma Kaka.

Nigeria: Ambassador Julius Momoh Udochi, Suite 500, Dupont Circle Building, Washington, DC.

Senegal: Ambassador Ousman Soce Diop.

Sierra Leone: William H. Fitzjohn (Liaison Officer), Suite 523, Dupont Circle Building, Washington, DC.

Sudan: Ambassador (Dr.) Osman El Hadari, 2346 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

Togo: Ambassador (Dr.) Andre Akapo.

Tunisia: Ambassador Mongi Slim, 2408 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

Upper Volta: Ambassador Frederick Guirra.

Statement required by the act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the acts of March 3, 1933, July 2, 1946 and June 11, 1960 (74 Stat. 208) showing the ownership, management and circulation of Africa Report published monthly at Washington, D. C. for November, 1960.

1) The publisher is the African-American Institute, Suite 505, Dupont Circle Bldg., Washington, D. C.; the editor is Helen Klischen, Suite 505, Dupont Circle Bldg., Washington, D. C.

2) The owner is the African-American Institute, Inc. (non-profit organization), Suite 505, Dupont Circle Bldg., Washington, D. C.

3) The average number of copies of each issue sold or distributed through the mail or otherwise distributed to paid subscribers in the United States during the preceding 12 months is 4230.



Above left: Nigeria Ambassador Julius Momoh Udochi; lower left: Ivory Coast Ambassador Konan Bedie; above: Mali Ambassador Adoulaye Maiga. (Photos from *The Washington Post*, by Harry Naltchayan and Charles Del Vecchio.)

Visitors . . .

PAUL A. AMEGEE, Togo's Minister of Public Works, Mines, Transport, Post and Telegraph, arriving in the US January 15 for consultations with the International Cooperation Administration and private travel.

JOSEPH TANKOANO of Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, a candidate for a doctorate in sociology at the *Institut International d'Etudes et de Recherches Diplomatiques*; and ROGER PAQUI of Porto-Novo, Dahomey, a candidate for a doctorate in sociology at the *Institut International d'Etudes et de Recherches Diplomatiques* and Secretary-General of the Dahomeyan Student Association in Paris, here until February 18 on 60-day US State Department student leader grants. They are scheduled to visit Washington DC, New York, Boston, Detroit, Ann Arbor, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Davis (California) and Atlanta. Programmed by the African-American Institute, 505 Dupont Circle Building, Washington 6, DC.

M. A. GHASSANY, Assistant Agriculture Officer in the Government of Zanzibar, here until early April on a 120-day US State Department specialist grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

GEOFFREY GRIFFIN, Colony Youth Organizer to the Government of Kenya, here until late March on a 120-day US State Department specialist grant. Programmed by the National Social Welfare Assembly, 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, New York.

